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JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION-A SOLUTION TO
CONGESTION?
BY JAMES G. FRANCE*
Ever since the publication of Dicken's Bleak House and Gladstone's
famous dictum, "Justice delayed is justice denied," proponents of structural
reform in the English and American court systems have been using the
crushing backlog of untried cases in our courts as the strongest argument
for court reorganization. Justice without delay has become the battle cry in
every struggle for structural change from the English Judicature Act of 1873,
through Roscoe Pound's strictures,' through the New Jersey Court reform
8
of 1947,2 and on to the New York and Illinois judicial article changes.
The reorganization plans have much merit so far as improving the
quality of justice is concerned. The plans secure better judges and probably
better and less disputatious trial lawyers, eliminate technicalities, particularly
at the pleading and appellate level, and produce a stronger and shorter chain
of administrative responsibility. It is only when claims are made that they will
improve the quantity of justice overnight that some question arises as to
whether or not court reorganization is being oversold.
Undeniably, there are other sound reasons for restructuring the courts.
These objectives include eliminating the duplication of courts of concurrent
jurisdiction, obtaining some mobility of judicial manpower, increasing both
the quantity and the quality of judges, restoring to the courts their control
over procedure, and centralizing administrative control. 4 Surprisingly, almost
all of these advantages sought by the reforms, with the possible exception of
the quality of judicial talent, relate at least indirectly back to the problem of
expeditious disposition of cases.
It might be well to analyze the situations in some prominent eastern
industrial states to see whether cure of congestion and delay is a justifiable
reason for structural change, whether avoidance of delay is capable of achievement without change and whether the change will necessarily or even probably
reduce the backlog of cases already filed and waiting months or years to
* Judge, Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh Appellate District; A.B., 1936, Brown
University; LL.B., 1941, Yale University.
1. See Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of
Justice, 21 J. AM. Ju. Soc'Y 177 (1937).
2. See generally VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM (1955).
3. N.Y. CONST. art. VI (approved Nov. 1961) ; ILL. CONST. art. VI (approved
Nov. 1961 and became effective Jan. 1, 1964). North Carolina and Colorado adopted
significant reforms at the same time as Illinois; however those changes are not discussed
in this Article. The Michigan changes are both too recent and too limited. See MIcH.
CONST. art. VI.
4. See McWilliams, Court Integration and Unification in the Model Judicial
Article, 47 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 13 (1963).
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be tried. Of these states, New Jersey alone has had more than fifteen years
of experience with a remodeled system; New York and Illinois are in the
course of putting into effect rather extensive reorganizations; Ohio and
Pennsylvania are still in the talking stage. Statistics on delay are available
in varying degrees from those states. New York and New Jersey provide
excellent studies in this area. 5 Reports from Ohio and Illinois are rather
generalized, 6 and information from Pennsylvania is scattered and not readily
7
available.
The standard judicial reorganization proposed and generally adopted
tends up to a point to follow lines of the Model Judicial Article of the
American Bar Association. Thus, the streamlining seeks a "unified" court,
on the model of the English Judicature Act, which is divided into a supreme
court, sometimes an intermediate appellate court, and a trial court of general
jurisdiction. Extensive powers of administration over the whole system are
given to the chief justice and to an administrative staff functioning under
his direction.8 Until some effort was made in Illinois in this direction, the
major states tended to turn their back on the recommendations of the Model
Article as it affected the so-called minor courts.9 New York, for example,
5. Those of New York are issued by its Judicial Conference annually in printed
hardback form complete with tables showing intake and disposition by types of cases
from every county and every district and, in particular, giving realistic calculations of
delay in jury cases for all areas. The New Jersey statistics, published by the Administrative Director of the Courts, gives detailed statistics, charts, and graphs on all types of
cases and dispositions for the state at large. Its emphasis is on productivity of individual
judges rather than particular geographical areas.
6. The Illinois reports, issued out of its supreme court by the Administrator and
the Deputy Administrator for Cook County in printed pamphlet form, contain detailed
textual analysis of the delay situation in each of its circuits and in Cook County. Material
on jury delay by circuits is extensive, but tables bearing on Cook County are somewhat
abbreviated.
The Ohio reports, mimeographed and issued monthly to all judges, contain little
more than basic input-output figures from each court. Annual compilations give breakdowns on business transacted in each county, but only by three major classifications
of litigation. No comparative tables, graphs, or analyses of delay are attempted. These
annual reports are compiled largely by volunteer help from dedicated general jurisdiction
judges, without help from any paid statistical section.
7. In Philadelphia a local court administrator was appointed in late 1962 to maintain statistics among other things. Private studies, publications including INSTITUTE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, DISPATCH AND DELAY (1961), and newspaper accounts are
sources.
8. See Holt, The Model State Judicial Article it; Perspective, 47 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y
6 (1963).
9. In many states which did not jump into full scale reorganization, progress was
made in replacing the fee system of the justices of the peace with adequate minor courts
of record. Virtually all jurisdictions have created city or municipal courts for large
centers of population, but Ohio in 1951 was one of the first to reduce them to some sort
of uniform jurisdiction and common procedure. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1901.01-.38
(Baldwin 1958). Ohio also eliminated the justices of the peace in rural areas by creating
county courts. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1907.011-.012 (Baldwin Supp. 1958). Connecticut's circuit courts and Maine's district courts represent later and more effective refine-
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was permitting its crazy-quilt pattern of city and town courts as well as the
justices of the peace to continue,1 0 and New Jersey, in addition to its county
district courts, was suffering with some 512 municipal courts which were
manned by part time judges, many of whom were untrained in the law.
In the face of the claims of elimination of congestion, what is the likely
impact of the enumerated advantages of reorganization on a delay problem
which exceeds five years in some portions of New York and Illinois at
the present time?
ELIMINATION OF COURTS

The strictures against duplication of courts go back even beyond Pound's
speech to the days when the Field Codes were developed. Once separate equity
courts were abolished, for the most part in the last century, there was for a
long period little jurisdictional overlap. The overlap that has developed since
that time has resulted from an effort to assist directly the court of general
jurisdiction with its docket load as in the cases of the New York and New
Jersey county courts, the Illinois superior court, and the Connecticut common
pleas court.1 This overlap also results from an indirect effort to assist by the
creation of minor courts of record with expanded monetary jurisdiction in
substitution for the outmoded justice-of-the-peace system.
Whatever the reasons for re-creation of duplicating jurisdiction and
whatever the vices of courts with concurrent jurisdiction, delay will result
only if the two sets of courts carry grossly unequal docket loads, so that the
one is idle while the other is overloaded. In most localities this is not true.
If one set of courts is loaded, so too is the other. In reorganized New Jersey,
pre-reorganized New York and unreorganized Ohio, there exist provisions
whereby the overloaded court of general jurisdiction can transfer suitable cases
to the lower court for trial. This device has been used extensively in New
Jersey, considerably less in New York, and to an unreported but probably
very minor extent in Ohio. 12 The presence of the device, however, and its
ments. See Williamson, A Down-East Approach to Local Justice, 47 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y
64 (1963). For other partial efforts, see [1962-1963] WIs. JUDICIAL COUNCIL BIENNIAL
REP. I and KARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1962).
10. But New York has taken steps to give its justices of the peace some special
training. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 20(c). For the detail of the training course, see 1963
N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP. 101-28.

11. The Illinois superior court was formally consolidated into the circuit court by
constitutional amendment. There are current proposals for similar consolidation in New
Jersey and Connecticut. KARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 723-25 (1962).
12. New Jersey reports 4591 cases so transferred in 1961-1962. 1962 N.J. AD.
DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS ANN. REP. 24. In New York 2161 cases were transferred before
trial and 582 at pre-trial. 1963 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP. table 12. There
are no statistics available from Ohio where by statute the consent of the transferee judge
is required. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.1 (Baldwin Supp. 1963).
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prompt use where needed would appear to indicate that the mere consolidation
of the two court systems would of itself have a very limited effect on reducing
delay.
TRANSFER OF JUDGES

The prospect of transferring judges from underworked to overbusy
courts has always been an attractive one for the judicial reorganizers. Taking
the total number of judges in all courts in all geographical divisions of a
state and putting them into a single unified structure to deploy where needed
would appear to be the equivalent of creating a multitude of new judgeships
and would appear to go a long way toward reducing the judicial backlog of
cases. If judges are to be considered geographically as bishops and rooks on
a giant chessboard, such may be the case. But judges are also men, often
men with growing families and local ties. As public servants, judges should
expect within limits to have to travel where the work takes them, but there
are limits. Four or five months per year of residence in a hotel while relieving
the docket of a distant metropolitan area is neither attractive to nor a wholesome influence upon a country judge.
A judge transferred to. a new area may find himself unsuited for the
different legal environment. The judge who performs well in rural communities may find his talents are not fitted to cope with the personalities
and the methods of the personal injuries trial practitioners of the city. Thus,

the dividends resulting from complete assignability of judges under a unified
court system may be much more apparent than real.
Under an almost unified court system, New Jersey manages an impressive total number of judges assigned for service outside their respective
counties of residence in addition to judges transferred from court to court
within the same geographical area.13 Such an achievement is not, however,
exclusive with the unified court. Transfers from downstate Illinois to Cook
14
County and elsewhere were extensive even before the state's reorganization.
Also, unreorganized Ohio, rich in its number of general jurisdiction judges,
contributed an astonishing total of 302 downstate judges to other counties
for periods varying from two or three days to three weeks or longer. 15 This
achievement in "horizontal" transfer was in addition to some limited success
in "vertical" transfers, where probate judges are authorized to sit within
their own county as general jurisdiction judges. 16 In New York which uses
13.

1962 N.J. AD. DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS ANN. REP. Supp. table 12.

14. 1962 ILL. COURT ADMINISTRATOR ANN. REP. 64.
15. 1962 OHIO COURTS SUMMARY 38. Unfortunately there is no record available of
total days served. Since assignments in Ohio are for a full three-month term, it is likely
that the 25 assignments to Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) alone represented at least 500
judge days.
16. The use of probate judges for general jurisdiction purposes in the larger counties
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the vertical method of assignment of judges of lesser courts to sit temporarily
as general jurisdiction judges, the results have not been so successful; for the
delay problem is merely transferred to the overcrowded court from which the
17
judge was originally transferred.
Admittedly, the restructuring by constitutional amendment and the
creation of powers in a chief justice to assign trial judges where needed would
be helpful in cases where these powers do not exist. Before assuming that
such a course is necessary, however, it should first be inquired whether or not
the power exists without an elaborate restructuring. If it exists, as it does in
the states noted, for example, has it been used to any considerable extent?
From the bare statistics from Illinois and New York, it would appear that
much more could be done; yet, even Ohio's record, which seems impressive,
has been attained in a manner almost casual and without detailed planning
and programming.18 Certainly, it would not seem necessary to reorganize the
entire court structure merely to put advance planning into a program of
assigning judges.
INCREASE IN

QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF JUDGES

It is conceded by all that substantial increases in both quantity and
quality of judges would aid in reducing congestion and delay. The difficulty
lies in seeing just how a restructuring of the courts accomplishes such a
result. It is usually assumed that the quality of judges is assured by two
advantages-tenure and money. Improvement of tenure can of course well
be achieved as part of a reorganization plan; yet, New York's constitutional
revision omitted this element entirely; and Illinois only adopted half of the
Missouri plan of achieving tenure. 19 It is not surprising that New York should
place little emphasis on improvement of tenure since both there and in Pennsylvania terms are relatively long20 and opposition to incumbents infrequent.
Judicial salaries, concededly, are effectively controlled by the legislatures,
although the Model Judicial Article for Constitutions contains provision for
is not feasible, but the fact that, in the smaller counties, the probate judge is available in
the absence of the others probably contributes to the willingness of the general jurisdiction
judge to go on assignment.
17. See 1962 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP. 21.
18. 32 counties in Ohio which are served by resident judges have fewer than 300
cases filed per year. 1962 OHIO COURTS SUMMARY table 5. It is apparent from the tabulator's report that not all of these served or were asked to serve assignments to overcrowded
counties. 1962 OHIO COURTS SUMMARY 37.
19. The half which was adopted secures to a judge an unopposed position on future
ballots after he has once been elected. For commentary on the apparent cynicism of this
partial adoption, see KARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 718 (1962).
20. Pennsylvania common pleas judges are elected for 10-year terms. PA. CONST.
art. V, § 15; New York supreme court justices serve 14-year terms. N.Y. CONST. art. VI
§ 6(c).
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a floor on all judicial salaries. 21 Here again, it should be noted that the judges
of New York and Illinois, prior to judicial reorganization, and those of
Pennsylvania, among the unreorganized, have long enjoyed a pay status among
22
the most satisfactory in the nation.
As to the quantity of judges, court reorganization almost never attempts
to freeze into a constitution a provision for the number of judges, nor should
it for reasons of flexibility. It is perhaps noteworthy that while the voters
of New York gave the courts a new structure, the New York legislature at
the same time gave these courts little new additional personnel with whom
to operate2 3 even though its Judicial Conference has pleaded in each of the
past two years for the creation of large numbers of additional judgeships and
has painted a dark picture of probable breakdown of the courts if congestion
grew worse. It is just barely possible that the New York legislature took
the reorganization advocates at their word and decided to let them prove
that reorganization alone, without all the judges requested, would do the
job. The Illinois legislature, well before the effective date of its new judicial
article, supplied the quantity of additional judgeships which was badly needed
to reduce the five-year backlog of Cook County jury cases; and some token
progress in this reduction is evident, even before the structural reform
has become effective. 24 Delaywise, Illinois' reorganization eventually may
be pointed out as a glowing success and New York's a dismal failure;
yet, in both cases it will be for reasons which have absolutely nothing to do
with the merits of the reorganizations themselves. On the other hand, it is Ohio,
with an uncoordinated court system and a rather ill-paid and ill-tenured
judiciary, 25 whose legislature has done the most to upgrade the quantity, if
21. Section 7, para. 1, provides: "The salaries of justices, judges and magistrates
shall be fixed by statute, but the salaries of the justices and judges shall not be less than
the highest salary paid to an officer of the executive branch of the State government other
than the Governor."
22. Base pay of Illinois circuit judges is $29,000 for those in Cook County and
$20,000 elsewhere. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1963).
Base pay for Pennsylvania common pleas judges is from $21,500 to $25,000 depending on county population. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 830.26 (1962).
Base pay of New York supreme court justices is $21,000 plus additional compensation
awarded by the city for its resident judges with nonresidents getting one-half of such

amount. N.Y.
23.

JUDICIARY LAW, §§

142, 144.

In 1960, 8 supreme court justices were added. 1961 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ANN. REP. 717. In 1961, 8 more were added. 1962 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP.
151. In 1962, 12 supreme court justices were added. 1963 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ANN. REP. 25. The conference had requested 31 additional supreme court justices and 7
additional county court judges in that year.
24. In 1962, 17 new judgeships were created in Cook County alone. The judges were
inducted in December and 14 of them were busy on the badly jammed law-jury assignment
by January 1963. See 1962 ILL. DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR FOR COOK COUNTY ANN.
REP. 78, 81, table III.
25. Salary for common pleas (general jurisdiction) judges ranges from a high of
$17,000.00 down to a low of $9,000.00 in rural counties. For comparable salaries in nearby
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not the quality, of judicial performance. Over a ten-year period from 1953 to
1963, that legislature has increased by stages the general jurisdiction bench
in Cuyahoga County, which includes Cleveland, by more than fifty per cent2 6
and made proportionate increases elsewhere. As a result, while no inroads
were made into the backlog of pending cases, the delay problem in Ohio has
not grown appreciably worse in recent years. This effect was achieved even
before judicial reorganization had gotten beyond the casual conversation
stage.
PROCEDURAL REFORM

The standard approach of reorganization advocates is to reason that the
leisurely, time-consuming process of pleading can be speeded up immensely
if only the legislatures will restore to the courts their inherent power to
27
control procedure, particularly that involved in bringing cases to issue.
There is little doubt that in most states the time allowance for the pleading
process and "getting to issue" is absurdly long. These time allowances became
fixed when the legislatures took the function over from the courts in the
mid-nineteenth century. At a time when roads were poor, the telephone
unknown, and the typewriter at most a toy, a case could be made for these
liberal time allowances. With modern communications, transportation which
places lawyers (and clients) at remote crossroads within a half hour of any
county seat, and where duplicating machines are called on to supplement the
typewriter and carbon paper, these same time allowances seem overly generous.
Undoubtedly, allowances could now be reviewed and appreciably shortened
if reorganization restored to the courts their power to control procedure;
however, the question remains, whether or not the trial courts would
use this power to telescope the time delay in getting cases to issue. Experience
in the past with these trial courts would indicate not. Far from eliminating
delay most trial judges contribute to it, for extensions of time in order to
allow opposing lawyers to file pleadings are the rule, not the exception. In
at least one court, the judges have delegated to jhe lawyers in each case the
power to waive the time limitations on filing pleadings, andthe "leave to plead"
has become the "consent to plead" ten, thirty, sixty days late, without the
judges' foreknowledge but with their approval.28 It must be confessed
populous states, see note 22 supra. The maximum term of office is six years, with
appointees required to run, opposed, at the next general election for the remainder of the
original term.
26. In 1954 there were 15 common pleas judges in Cuyahoga County. Elections by
1964 will qualify a total of 23.
27. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 16-17.
28.

See OHIO C. P.

CT. FOR CUYAHOGA

COUNTY R. 8(d). The approval quickly

evaporates when these same lawyers attempt to file such "consents to delay" in
other Ohio jurisdictions, although one criminal defendant's counsel filed elsewhere a
"consent" of five months to file assignments of error and brief on appeal while his client
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that, in that particular county and in many others where the practice is
indulged, such delays in getting to issue seem small as compared with a later
thirty-month delay in getting to trial; but since calendars are made up from
cases "at issue," the first delay is merely added to the second. Thus, the trial
judges seem remarkably unlikely depositories for the power suggested.
SUPREME COURT CONTROL OVER TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATION

It is argued that confiding full administrative control and direction over
the trial courts to a state supreme court will have an important effect on the
conditions permitting delay. There appears to be much surface merit to a
plan which gives the chief justice full power to make and enforce assignment
of trial judges where needed. But just how much additional force can be
asserted by a chief justice on a trial judge who is unwilling to go elsewhere?
Securing judges who will do a willing and satisfactory job in another community is still a matter largely of salesmanship. Judges are induced, not
compelled, to take assignments, whether the power to assign judges elsewhere
is confided loosely by statute or strictly by constitution.
New Jersey is frequently cited as the classic example of how power of
control in the supreme court aids in reducing congestion. New Jersey,
however, has been an example, not of how the naked power controls, but of
how a forceful and magnetic person in a position of power can create devices
to insure that the work gets out. Under Chief Justice Vanderbilt and his
successors the "stop watch" system of keeping count on a judge's time has
produced dividends in the productivity of individual judges. It would be
quite interesting to observe whether or not control, if conferred, would result
in equally effective time and motion studies in Chicago, Philadelphia,
Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh. Certainly, if such studies carried with
them the threat of exposure of the laggards by the press, the darkened courtrooms might be fewer, or if the judges were not in chambers they might at
least be found in the law libraries rather than at clubs and board rooms on
weekday afternoons.
Perhaps an outstanding example of the difference between bare power
and the vigorous use of such power is illustrated by the difference in treatment
given the minor courts in the states of New Jersey and Ohio. Following reorganization in New Jersey its supreme court in the exercise of rule-making
power imposed upon the minor courts in traffic cases not only uniform procedural rules but a complete form of pleading and record-keeping. This
system was called, for simplicity, the Uniform Traffic Ticket,2 9 and was
was serving his sentence in a state institution. A year after conviction his client had not
had his appeal heard.
29. For a description of the tickets and the system, see Economos, Administration
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subsequently instituted by Missouri and some other jurisdictions. Since Ohio's
minor courts are creatures of statute with no constitutional inhibitions against
similar control, an experiment in this limited field was planned there. The
legislature conferred precise powers on the supreme court to set up a
similar regulation, ° and a committee was designated in 1960 to draft the
rules and pleadings. It did so. After a hearing on them the court altered
the committee. The changed committee restudied the problem and reported
once again. In 1962 the court concluded that it did not desire to impose any
such rules or forms "at the present time." 3' In 1964 Ohio still has no uniform
rules or forms for minor courts in traffic cases despite four years of legislative
authority to create them.
Imposition of traffic court uniformity is a far cry from the problem
of imposing effective rules for prompt disposition of cases in courts of general
jurisdiction. Lack of desire to exercise the former, however, would indicate
equal indisposition to face up to the challenge of the latter, thus forecasting
that the Supreme Court of Ohio will scarcely be bursting with enthusiasm to
assert any effective degree of control over the practices of trial courts.
OTHER SOLUTIONS TO DELAY

If structural changes are not the answer to the problem of delay in the
litigation process, what other solutions exist? The most popular solution
among judges is, of course, more judges. The Ohio and the recent, but limited,
Chicago experiences of adding judges would seem to show some promise.
Ohio has not at least slipped appreciably further behind in its docket problem.
Its total pending civil case load at the end of 1962 had grown only
by 2,700 cases from 1960 to a total of 46,741 undisposed-of cases as compared
with 45,000 cases filed in that year. 32 These figures compare favorably with
the New York record of- an increase of 12,000 cases in a similar period,
reaching a grand total of 69,000 3 pending cases with 59,000 cases filed.3 4
In the same period New Jersey's pending list grew by some 3,500 cases to
35
25,000 out of 26,000 cases filed.
of Traffic Court, in JUDGE AND PROSECUTOR IN TRAFFIC COURT 65 (American Bar Ass'n
Pub. 1951).
30. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2937.46 (Baldwin Supp. 1963) (Effective Jan 1,
1960). The purpose of the provisions were fully disclosed in advance by the Ohio State
Bar Association.
31. Feb. 14, 1962. 35 OHIo BAR 210 (1962).
32. 1962 OHIO COURTS SUMMARY 32; 1960 OHIO COURTS SUMMARY 18. The increase
in civil case pendency was partly offset by a decrease in pending cases of other types.
33. 1960 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP. table 11; 1963 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP. table 11. Matrimonial cases are included in the New York reports but

not in the Ohio and New Jersey totals.

174.

34.

1963 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP.

35.

Total pending cases in New Jersey for purposes of comparison are 23,693 in the
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If figures alone are consulted, apparently an increase in the number of
judges does not noticeably decrease individual productivity. Ohio averaged
496 dispositions for each of its 170 judges 36 compared with 385 for each
of New York's 137 judges3 7 and 301 dispositions for each of New
Jersey's 104 judges. 3 There does, however, appear to be a leveling-off
point in individual productivity when the number of judges is increased. In
1960 Cuyahoga County judges disposed of an average of 783 cases each; the
following year with more judges, average disposition fell to 746; in 1962 it
rose again to 821, although there is reason to believe that a generous infusion
of assigned judges who were not taken account of contributed to that year's
result. Pending case load in Cuyahoga County increased in 1960 by some 1,300
cases; the following biennium it remained relatively constant.8 9 Thus far in
Ohio more judges have managed merely to stay even with the number
of filings and have not cut into the pending case backlog.
Various devices, some bordering on the bizarre, have been contrived to
reduce docket congestion. In New York and Illinois "blockbuster" techniques
of assigning old, hard-core cases to a special group of experienced trial judges
for limited periods have produced some results.4 0 In Philadelphia special
assignment to arbitrators has been tried. In Cleveland the device of using trial
lawyers as pre-trial judges was tried until the realization came about that a
lawyer busy pre-trying someone else's case could not at the same time be
preparing and trying his own and that the pre-trial lawyers' cases were piling
up more than usual. New York, New Jersey, and Ohio have all tried transferring cases for trial to the lower courts. 41 Unfortunately such cases are often
not so transferred until pre-trial time, which means that they are by then old
cases. Particularly in New York, but also in New Jersey, major criminal cases
are routinely tried in the subordinate court, which has only resulted in severe
docket congestion in the subordinate courts themselves.
Certainly the most bizarre approach was tried in New York. There a
"readiness rule" was adopted in 1956 which merely delayed placing the
law division and 1,500 general equity cases. 1962 N.J. AD. DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS ANN.
REP. 9, 10, 18. The actual total of pending cases is somewhat higher than the figures show
since New Jersey, unlike Ohio, shows a case as pending for this purpose only when the
first answering pleading is filed. Id. at 9; see also 1962 OHIO COURTS SUMMARY tables 2, 3.
36. For the purpose of this comparison criminal cases disposed of are excluded from
the total output since in New York the overwhelming majority of felonies are disposed
of other than in its court of general jurisdiction.
37. 1963 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP. 132, 177.
38. Criminal case dispositions in New Jersey and Ohio are excluded for the reason
given in note 36 supra.
39. 1962 OHIo COURTS SUMMARY table 5; 1960 OHIO COURTS SUMMARY table 5.
40. 1962 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP. 42-44; 1962 ILL. COURT ADMINISTRATOR ANN. REP. 76.
41. See note 12 supra.
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case on calendar until certain additional statements and filings had been
made. The initial result was statistically to reduce the calendar but not the
number of pending cases and to show on the calendar only those cases which
were due or long overdue for trial but not all those which had been commenced. As was predicted, this purely statistical gain was at best a temporary
expedient which masked the real problem. 42 Now cases "at readiness" have
hit the general jurisdiction courts in New York in their full volume. A
similar statistical result obtains in New Jersey where a case is not pending
43
for calendar purposes until answering pleading- is filed.
A WORKABLE SOLUTION
If neither reorganization of courts nor some of the dubious expedients
noted above are to be relied upon for reducing congestion and delay, are
there any answers besides the unthinkable (to most lawyers) solutions of
abolishing the jury system or even of having administrative tribunals handle
the personal injury cases which now clog jury dockets? It is suggested that
three steps, resolutely followed, would produce the desired results:
The first step is the application of the standard panacea of more judges.
The Ohio experience in the past ten years indicates that this would at least
eliminate any increase in congestion and delay. A number would be needed
which would at least make the total general jurisdiction judges times their
average disposition rate equal the present filing rate plus ten per cent. The tenper-cent increment is a purely arbitrary figure which would dispose of
accumulated backlog at a different rate in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York,
where the delay times are 74 months, 67 months, and 62 months respectively,
than in Cleveland where the delay time is normally not in excess of 30
months. However the ten-per-cent figure is the maximum which should be
sought; otherwise, there is the real possibility that once docket congestion is
reduced there would be many idle judges.44 Also, once the delay time is
reduced, the added percentage will be needed because of the increased filings
within the next few years resulting from increased litigation due to the
exploding population now beginning to reach adulthood. There is, however,
some ground for suspicion that more judges are not a complete answer. The
slight but none the less discernible decrease in productivity of individual
judges when their total number is sufficient to cope with the volume of in42.

1962 N.Y.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP.

21.

43. Only 75% of complaints filed in the court year 1962 in New Jersey went on the

calendar for statistical purposes in that year. 1962 N.J. AD.

DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS

8.
44. Also to be considered is the effect on already overworked trial counsel who necessarily will have to take on more associates as their cases are spread around more courtrooms with possibility of required simultaneous appearances in two or more at the same
time.
ANN. REP.
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coming cases indicates that these judges may, even unconsciously, fear that if
they work too hard they will eventually work themselves out of their jobs.
They might, therefore, merely divide the incoming case load by the total
number of judges so that there would always be a backlog.
Secondly, a way must be found to maintain and increase individual
productivity. The New Jersey "stop watch" system is a partial, but only a
partial, answer. Under that system each New Jersey judge disposes of approximately 415 cases, criminal as well as civil, per year. Without it, each
New York judge disposes of not quite 400 per year. Also without it, the average
Ohio judge disposes of more than 500. 4 5 It is true that in Ohio this figure
includes not only pleas in criminal cases but also certain tax judgments and
commercial judgment confessions (cognovits) which involve an absolute
minimum of judicial effort, but it is probable that the New Jersey and
New York cases also involve like cases. In any event, the "stop watch" system
apparently needs some refinements, for a system of merely finding out what
a judge does with his time, without more, is like that of collecting other
judicial statistics, without more; both are merely a first step toward doing
something constructive. What is needed, as a second step, is the difficult and
unpopular one of informing judges that some of the cases are not worth so
much time to society and that they should dispose of those cases more quickly
in order to get on to the next ones. This requires some specialized knowledge
and some authority, either legal or moral, over the judge who puts in excessive
time on easy cases. The threat of exposure by a co-operative press might in
this case be a most useful adjunct to the incentive of more judges. In areas
like Ohio which have rural judges without a sufficient workload, 46 a more
determined and organized effort to get them to places where there is more
work to be done is essential. While in the past it has always been known where
extra judges were needed, not much effort has been expended in deterinining, in advance, how much time the underworked judges can spare and
in encouraging them to plan their availability for assignment well in advance.
The third and final step concerns the problem of internal scheduling of
cases for trial, a scheduling that will keep trials moving smoothly from one case
45.

Including criminal cases the average disposition of the Ohio judges reaches 579

cases, a figure which is reduced considerably by the average output of 145 cases per
judge (due to lack of raw material) in Ohio's nine smallest counties. The average
out-put per judge in Ohio's ten largest counties rose from 770 cases in 1960 to 777 in
1962. 1962 OHIO COURTS SUMMARY table 8.
46. Ohio gave up any meaningful distribution of its common pleas judges into
multi-county districts or circuits in 1912. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3 adopted that year
requires that there be at least one resident judge in each of its 88 counties, no matter how
small. Nine of these counties of less than 20,000 population each have a total of nine
judges to handle a total of 1,437 cases filed. Twenty other counties with fewer than 30,000
persons each have twenty judges to handle a total of 4,469 cases.
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to the next. This involves starting trials promptly, avoiding initial delay
for settlement conferences which should have been held weeks before, recessing
in order to summon the witnesses who should have been summoned but
were not, and conferring in chambers to discuss points of law that should
have been anticipated but were not. It involves reasonably accurate scheduling
of trials several days in advance so that it will not be discovered on the eve
47
or morning of trial that counsel is due in two courtrooms at the same time.
CONCLUSION

Some of the solutions to these problems-such as pre-trial disclosure
of number, names and estimated time pan of witnesses' testimony,48 or the
disciplining of counsel who refuse to bargain in good faith at pre-trial but
negotiate endlessly with the jury in an anteroom-may take the romance out
of the courtroom; however, they will dispose, on a businesslike and equally fair
basis, claims from a multitude of whiplashes, sprained joints, and broken
bones. Personal injuries attorneys have long made a business of their profession; they should not be heard to object if the courts elect to become businesslike too. There is nothing about judicial reorganization that is inconsistent with
such an approach as is suggested in this Article. 49 There is always the fear,
however, that judges will take so long becoming accustomed to their new
structural relationships that they will be tempted to postpone any real effort
to streamline trial scheduling themselves or to engage competent business or
production-line managers to do the job for them.50 Nor is there anything
about reorganization that forbids putting on adequate manpower for the
job; it is merely that the real need for the manpower may be overlooked in
the rush to reorganize.
47. The "engaged counsel" rule which permits counsel to set over a case if actually
engaged in trial in another court has some validity as long as cases come out of central
assignment rooms at random into nineteen or twenty-five jury courtrooms on the same day.
With advance scheduling, including elimination of cases marked for speedy settlement, the
courts may reasonably require trial counsel to engage a number of associates sufficient to
try the total number of his cases that must, after reasonable adjustments, be tried within
a stipulated period.
48. This solution is particularly infuriating to certain experienced trial counsel when
used by federal courts as a matter of required disclosure to avoid surprise and "trial from
ambush." For comments during a forum discussion of the practice, see 30 INs.
COUNSEL J. 574, 576-78 (1963).
49. At least the tenure aspect of reorganization is recommended before trial judges
impose all the scheduling reforms suggested; otherwise, many of the trial judges might
well become trial lawyers after the next election.
50. Most judges as well as lawyers will shudder at the thought of having anyone
but a trained lawyer telling them when a case should go to trial and how long it should
take to try it. Cries of "lack of due process" will be heard; yet, some experience on the
trial bench listening sympathetically to stories from counsel as to why a case cannot be
tried at a given time would convince anyone that the job of saying "no" is better left to
someone outside the camaraderie of the working bar. Due process is very seldom an
element in denial of continuances.
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Judicial reorganization is undoubtedly important to the quality of
justice rendered. It has little effect on its quantity, and presently it is the
quantity plus years of neglect which is the overriding problem. If quantity
and quality can be simultaneously improved, so much the better. But where
the public will not buy both at the same time, as is probable, the legal
profession is in the unfortunate position of having to insist on quantity
first and to hope that the courts can be reorganized later. If judicial reorganization continues to be sold under the claim that it will, in and of itself, eliminate
or reduce docket congestion without improving judges' work habits and
without radically streamlining the process of trial scheduling, then it is
being oversold. If, as appears to be the case in New York, mere reshuffling
of the courts is being substituted for adequate staffing and businesslike
management of trials, sheer volume of undigested and indigestible litigation
threatens a breakdown of the processes of justice.

